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Abstract: 
This paper estimates economic models of the determinants of state benefit levels in the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program using 1969-1992 data. These models have been extensively researched; 
however, the existing literature has produced an unacceptably wide range of estimates. Using alternative 
econometric procedures, this paper systematically examines both the specification assumptions underlying 
previous analyses as well as several additional specification issues. It is, therefore, able to replicate and 
reconcile estimates from previous studies and to provide updated, consensus estimates of the demand for 
welfare generosity. It finds that changes in the average level of income within states have small but statistically 
significant positive effects on benefits with the confidence bounds on the elasticity extending from 0.11 to 0.82. 
Changes in the effective price of redistribution are found to have, at most, weak negative effects with elasticities 
in the range of -0.14 to 0.02. These results are used to evaluate the effects of block grant provisions in the 
recently enacted welfare reform legislation.  
 
Article: 
I. Introduction  
The controversy surrounding redistribution policy sustains considerable interest in the analysis of poverty relief. 
Until recently, the largest means-tested cash welfare program in the United States was Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). This program operated as a federal/state partnership with the federal government 
setting general guidelines and providing subsidies, but leaving the determination of benefit levels and most 
other day-to-day operational aspects to the states. Features of the AFDC program had been under sharp attack 
from politicians, analysts, and academics across the ideological spectrum for some time. This push for change 
culminated in 1996 with the enactment of sweeping reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF). TANF sets strict time limits on the receipt of benefits and increases work requirements among 
recipients. The relationship between the federal and state governments has also been fundamentally altered, 
with the new program relaxing some operating guidelines and changing the funding formula from a matching 
subsidy to a block grant.  
 
The potential effects of these reforms raise numerous interesting questions and will without doubt be a major 
focus of policy research for years to come. One simple question, however, that economists should already be 
prepared to answer is: what specific effects will the change in the funding formula have on benefit levels.'? 
Recasting the state's benefit determination problem in a consumer-choice framework, the change from a 
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matching subsidy to a block grant alters the state's budget constraint by both increasing its effective price of 
redistributing money to AFDC recipients and increasing its available income. Figure 1 shows the effect of a 
block grant equal in size to the state's original subsidy under the matching formula on the optimal level of 
AFDC benefits assuming no interactions with other assistance programs and no maintenance of effort 
requirement-essentially what has happened under TANF.(n1) As indicated in the graph, the policy change 
represents an income-compensated price increase with predictable negative effects on the demand for 
redistribution. Given suitable estimates of states' welfare-demand functions, predicting the impact of block 
grants on benefits is straightforward.  
 
In fact, an extensive literature--dating back to Orr's (1976) pioneering study of AFDC expenditures as a public 
good---examines differences in the generosity of AFDC programs across states and over time. While these 
studies have considered additional issues including interactions among various types of public welfare programs 
such as Food Stamps and Medicaid, interactions between states in the determination of benefits, and residents' 
underlying preferences for redistribution, they have all also examined basic economic hypotheses involving the 
sensitivity of state AFDC benefits to changes in resources and costs. Unfortunately, these studies, which also 
differ in their data and econometric methodology, have produced widely varying results, and, to date, no 
systematic reconciliation of findings has been undertaken. Thus, as a practical matter, the existing results are 
not useful for evaluating the potential effects of the conversion from matching to block grants on benefit levels.  
 
This study uses a long panel of state-level data to estimate these basic economic relationships. The analysis has 
several goals. First, it replicates and reconciles previous price and income results using a consistent set of data. 
In particular, the study examines whether the alternative fixed-effect methods employed to control for omitted-
variables bias and instrumental-variable approaches used to control for endogeneity bias account for the 
differences in findings across studies. Second, the study performs a systematic analysis of these and other 
econometric specification issues such as instrument selection, variable measurement, structural shift, and 
functional form to obtain appropriate, defensible estimates of the demand parameters. Finally, the study uses its 




From this analysis, the study is able to reproduce and reconcile the range of previous findings. It confirms that 
differences in methodology account for these results. As to issues of appropriate specification, it finds not only 
that the state-specific, fixed-effect controls that were used in some previous studies belong in the demand 
model, but that other types of fixed-effect controls belong as well. Interestingly, however, once these additional 
fixed-effect controls are included, endogeneity does not appear to be a significant problem. Estimates from 
regressions that withstand the various specification tests indicate that changes in income have modest positive 
effects on benefits levels with the confidence bound on the elasticity ranging from 0.11 to 0.82. Changes in 
price are found to have, at most, weak negative effects with implied elasticities no lower than -0.14. 
Accordingly, we predict that the change to block grants is likely to produce only a small decrease in the average 
level of benefits across states.  
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses the theoretical model and 
estimation methodologies used in previous studies of welfare expenditures. Findings from these studies are also 
summarized and evaluated in section II. Section III describes the longitudinal state-level data used in the 
analysis. Estimation results appear in section IV. The discussion in section IV includes comparisons with earlier 
findings as well as detailed specification analyses. Section V discusses the implications of our estimates for the 
newly enacted welfare reform legislation. Concluding remarks appear in section VI.  
 
II. Theoretical and Empirical Models of Welfare Expenditures  
A. Theory and Previous Findings  
Most previous empirical research on AFDC generosity has been based on a median voter model of public 
expenditures.(n2) In this model, the median voter in state i is assumed to have preferences U(ci, ai; Zi) defined 
over the voter's own consumption, ci, and the consumption enjoyed by a representative AFDC recipient as a 
result of program benefits, ai.(n3) Voter i's preferences are conditioned on a set of variables, Zi, which might 
include demographic characteristics, attitudes, values, or other state-specific factors. The voter selects levels of 
ci and ai. subject to a budget constraint, yi = ci + piai, where yi represents the voter's pretax income, and pi her 
share of the cost of extending one additional dollar of benefits to each of the state's AFDC recipients. The price 
of benefits can be expressed  
 
 
where si is the portion of state expenditures matched by the federal government, Ri is the number of AFDC 
recipients, and Ni is the state's population. Because AFDC is federally subsidized and its costs are spread over 
all taxpayers, pi is substantially less than one dollar.  
 
Given these preferences and constraints, the voter has an optimal demand for benefits. Under the conditions of 
the median-voter theorem, this will also be the benefit level determined by majority voting. We write this 




The central concern of this study and much of the empirical literature on AFDC generosity is to estimate models 
like equation (2) to determine the sensitivity of benefits to changes in income and price.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the methodologies and results of twelve studies that have estimated state-level expenditure 
functions similar to equation (2). The studies differ in their definition of benefits, specification of price, 
econometric technique, and the particular states and time periods under study.(n4) Not surprisingly, these 
differences have led to substantial variation in the estimated price and income effects. Estimated price effects 
range from the negative and elastic results generated by Gramlich (1982) and Gramlich and Laren (1984) to the 
positive results reported by Shroder (1995), with the majority of studies reporting small and negative results. 
Income estimates also range from strongly negative (Gramlich &Laren, 1984) to strongly positive (Hulten, 
McCallum, Durman, & Michel, 1982). The studies, which are listed chronologically, display increasing 
technical sophistication and concern for various problems of misspecification. Unfortunately, this growing 
awareness of possible misspecification has not lead to convergence in results. We outline some of the 
fundamental specification issues below.  
 
B. General Econometric Issues  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (2) will be biased if there are omitted preference or 
institutional factors that are correlated with the observed characteristics used to model benefits. For instance, if 
states with strong tastes for redistribution also tend to have high incomes, the effects of preferences on benefit 
levels, if not controlled for, will be erroneously attributed to income. The most common approach to reducing 
bias associated with omitted variables has been to include indirect controls, such as racial composition of the 
AFDC caseload or regional dummies, to proxy differences in voter and recipient characteristics across states. 
Estimates have been shown to be moderately sensitive to the inclusion of these controls (Orr, 1979; Hulten et 
al., 1982). A handful of studies (e.g., Gramlich, 1982; Gramlich & Laren, 1984; Moffitt, Ribar, & Wilhelm 
(1998), Ribar & Wilhelm, 1996; Shroder, 1995) have gone farther and included state- and in some cases time-
specific fixed effects.(n5)As already noted, the results from several of these studies diverge from those in the 
rest of the literature as well as from each other.  
 
In addition to omitted variables bias, OLS estimates of equation (2) may be biased due to endogeneity in the 
individual components of price, Ri/Ni and (1- si). Endogeneity in the first component arises because of the direct 
effects of benefit guarantees and reduction rates on program eligibility and the incentive effects of benefits on 
recipiency and related behavior such as work, marriage, and fertility decisions. A simple model of recipiency 
can be expressed as  
 
 
where Ei describes alternative economic and noneconomic opportunities for potential eligibles. Ignoring 
endogeneity may positively bias the estimate of recipiency's effect (through pi) on benefits in equation (2). To 
reduce endogeneity, some studies have used various lags of recipiency as proxies for the actual value in 
equation (2) and found that such respecification has little effect on the estimation results. A few other studies 
have used instrumental-variable methods (e.g., Gramlich, 1982; Gramlich & Laren, 1984; Ribar & Wilhelm, 
1996; Shroder, 1995) and obtained much different price effects.  
 
In the early data, the state financing share (1- si) may also be endogenous because, under the old AFDC 
reimbursement schedule, states simultaneously selected benefit levels and matching rates.(n6) An additional 
complication is multicollinearity caused by the matching rate's functional dependence on state per capita 
income.(n7)  
 
C. Other Issues  
Several studies--including Gramlich (1982), Gramlich and Laren (1984), Hulten et al. (1982), Moffitt (1990), 
Orr (1979), and Shroder (1995)--have suggested modifying the median voter's utility function and budget 
constraint to include other forms of public assistance (such as Food Stamps and Medicaid) that might be viewed 
as substitutes for AFDC benefits. Interprogram effects from additional forms of public assistance raise complex 
theoretical problems that are associated with modeling outcomes in multipleissue elections and which have not 
been addressed. There are econometric complications as well. First, there is the practical difficulty of defining a 
set of relevant alternatives. The literature's narrow categorization of other public assistance available to AFDC 
eligibles is justified on grounds of data availability and econometric tractability; yet, in principle, the definition 
could be expanded to include all social service, health, and education spending. Second, there is difficulty in 
finding structural variation in federally administered programs, like Food Stamps, that is independent of the 
variation in AFDC spending or other explanatory measures. In the case of Food Stamps, the basic regulations 
have been uniform across all states except Alaska and Hawaii since coverage became universal in 1975. Thus, 
subsequent structural variation in this program is virtually indistinguishable from a general time series. Third, if 
other forms of public assistance act as substitutes for AFDC, it is logical to expect that the reverse might also be 
true. Hence, benefits under these programs should be modeled as endogenous determinants of AFDC generosity 
with all of the attendant problems of identification.(n8)  
 
Three studies (Gramlich, 1982; Gramlich & Laren, 1984; Shroder, 1995) also test hypotheses regarding 
interstate competition by specifying the vector of alternative opportunities, Ei, in equation (3) to incorporate 
benefit levels in neighboring states, an (i.e., include migration to and recipiency in other states as alternatives to 
recipiency in one's own state). These analyses have been motivated by variants of the "welfare magnet" 
hypothesis.(n9) The econometric complications associated with analyses of interstate competition are similar to 
those described for interprogram effects. With respect to definitions of relevant alternatives, theory provides 
little guidance in determining which states constitute the appropriate set of neighbors. As before, finding 
convincingly independent sources of variation is also a problem.(n10) Lastly, the possibility of reciprocal 
causality raises concerns regarding endogeneity bias.  
 
While issues involving both interprogram and interstate competition are interesting and relevant to the ongoing 
policy debate, it is not clear whether either issue absolutely needs to be addressed to obtain useful estimates of 
price and income effects. Because these issues introduce so many additional econometric complications and 
because preliminary analyses indicated that our price and income estimates (which are the focus of the study) 
are not particularly sensitive to their being addressed, we do not directly examine interactions between AFDC 
and other programs or interactions between states.(n11)  
 
III. Data  
The empirical analysis uses longitudinal annual state-level data collected from a variety of sources. Short 
descriptions, sources, and simple statistics for the analysis variables are listed in table 2. The data extend from 
1969 to 1992 and, thus, cover most of the time periods examined in previous studies. However, for reasons that 
are outlined below, our empirical investigation concentrates on the final eleven years of data. The earlier data 
are used in a few sensitivity analyses. All dollar amounts in the data set are converted to real (1987) values 
using the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator (PCD).  
 
The analysis employs several alternative measures of welfare generosity. Our primary measure is the maximum 
monthly AFDC benefit for a family of four with no other income. While this measure does not capture all the 
dimensions of welfare generosity such as differences in payments by family size, reductions for recipients' own 
financial resources, and interactions with other assistance programs, it does represent a direct and easily 
interpreted policy outcome. Because of the shortcomings of the maximum-benefits variable, we also conduct 
sensitivity analyses using three other measures of welfare generosity: average monthly AFDC benefits per 
recipient, maximum combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefits for a family of four, and maximum combined 
AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid for a family of four. The benefits-per-recipient measure is advantageous 
because it summarizes information about state policies and recipient characteristics into a single index of 
welfare generosity; however, unlike our other measures, it is not a direct policy outcome. The other two 
combined benefit measures incorporate interactions between the various major public welfare programs, and 
thus provide a more realistic description of the total benefits package available to poor families. The weakness 
of these measures is that neither is adjusted for recipient characteristics and both include a benefit (Food 
Stamps) that is not controlled by the states.  
 
From equation (1), the price of AFDC benefits is the product of the state's financing share and its recipiency 
rate. The former depends on the federal matching rate, which, prior to 1983, the states selected from either the 
AFDC or FMAP schedules. We do not explicitly model the state's choice of schedule, which may lead to 
selectivity bias in some of our results from earlier years (Moffitt, 1984). Selectivity bias should not be a 
problem in the later data and should in any case be eliminated in the two-stage analyses where we instrument 
for price. Our recipiency variable for each year is computed by averaging the state's total number of AFDC 
recipients in July and December and dividing by the total population.(n12)  
 
The income measure used in our analysis is annual per capita total personal income in each state. This measure, 
which is intended to serve as a proxy for the median voter's income, is adopted for reasons of comparability and 
data availability.(n13) Our analysis also includes several other state-and year-specific demographic and political 
variables as controls. These variables, which are listed in table 2, all have straightforward interpretations as 
measures of either voter or recipient characteristics.  
 
As mentioned, most of our analyses are based on the last eleven years (1982 to 1992) of data. The principal 
reason for splitting our sample is that tests for structural shift (discussed in the next section) indicated that it was 
inappropriate to pool the data. We focus on the newer observations because of our interest in applying our 
findings to an analysis of the TANF provisions, but we acknowledge that the older data would have been more 
useful in replicating some of the older studies. The start of the selected period corresponds to the first year 
following the enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. Among other things, 
OBRA dramatically cut welfare eligibility, decreased voluntary work incentives for welfare recipients, and 
allowed states to impose work requirements (workfare) on recipients through Community Work Experience 
Programs; Robins (1990) reports evidence that these changes substantially altered the behavior of welfare 
recipients. The start year also corresponds to a natural break in the periods considered by previous studies; only 
two of the studies listed in Table 1--Moffitt (1990) and Moffitt et al. (1998)--incorporate both pre- and post-
OBRA data. Lastly, the start date reflects the point where almost all states were using the FMAP subsidy 
formula.(n14)  
 
IV. Results  
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list estimates and specification test results from an initial series of longitudinal state-level 
benefit regressions that use a consistent set of 1982-1992 data and incorporate alternative features of the 
analyses described in table 1. Although they are not exact replications, the regressions do illustrate how 
different specification assumptions can explain the variety of results reported in the literature. The first five 
regressions use the logarithm of the maximum AFDC benefit for a family of four as a dependent variable, while 
the last two use the log of the maximum combined AFDC and Food Stamp amount. All of the models include 
logarithms of the price and income variables as regressors as well as a consistent set of other demographic and 
political controls. Because of the double-log specification, the coefficients on price and income in each model 
can be directly interpreted as elasticities. The independent variables are all lagged one year to account for the 




Following the methodology of the earliest studies, the first specification in table 3.1 is an OLS regression in 
which the longitudinal data for each state are pooled and treated as independent observations. As with the initial 
empirical studies, per capita income is estimated to have a strong positive effect on AFDC benefits. However, 
unlike those studies, the income response is less than unit elastic, and the price variable is estimated to have a 
significant positive effect. While the specifications do not reproduce the findings of the earliest studies which 
used pre-OBRA data, the results are similar to OLS estimates reported by Ribar and Wilhelm (1996), which 
used 1988-1991 post-OBRA data. Regressions (not shown) estimated with pre-OBRA data do replicate the 
initial studies' findings.  
 
The second specification adds state-fixed effects to the model. The state controls are jointly significant, and 
their addition noticeably decreases the coefficient estimates for income and price. Though small and statistically 
insignificant, the coefficient on price becomes negative. The third model in table 3.1 contains the same 
observed controls as the second; however, the price measure is treated as an endogenous variable and is 
instrumented using the average benefit level in all other states. The specification of this model--in particular, its 
use of state-fixed effects and choice of instrument--resembles the procedure employed by Gramlich (1982). 
Like that study, the third specification produces a large negative price elasticity and, like the subsequent study 
by Gramlich and Laren (1984), a large negative income elasticity.  
 
In the next row, we examine the sensitivity of the third specification to an issue not considered in the studies by 
Gramlich (1982) and Gramlich and Laren (1984)--the inclusion of general time effects--and see that the price 
and income estimates are sensitive to the point of the coefficients actually being reversed. Model 3E examines 
the sensitivity of the estimates from the third specification to an alternative set of instruments for price. It adopts 
a set of instruments that is similar to the set used by Shroder (1995) (i.e., uses the sex ratio, female 
unemployment rate, retail wage, and averages of the benefit level, sex ratio, female unemployment rate, and 
retail wage in contiguous states to predict the price variable). Once again, the results from the third model are 
found to be sensitive to alternative specification assumptions.  
The sixth specification replaces the dependent variable from Model 3E with the maximum combined AFDC and 
Food Stamp amount. This combined measure is closer to the outcome examined by Shroder (1995). Because the 
Food Stamp Program effectively taxes AFDC benefits (after a standard disregard, Food Stamp awards are 
reduced thirty cents for each dollar of AFDC income), there is less variability in combined benefits across states 
than in AFDC benefits alone. Relative to the estimates from Model 3E, the price coefficient in this specification 
is closer to zero while the income coefficient is more strongly positive. The final specification adds a set of 
general time effects to the previous model; estimates reveal that the price and income coefficients are 
moderately sensitive to this respecification.  
 
The results from table 3.1 are consistent with the range of estimates from the empirical literature and fairly well 
replicate the specific findings of the most recent studies. They also indicate that estimates of the effects of price 
and income on welfare generosity are sensitive to alternative fixed-effect controls for unobserved heterogeneity, 
procedures to account for the possible endogeneity of the price variable, and the specification of the dependent 
variable. Figures from table 3.2 further reveal that the specification test results themselves are sensitive to 
alternative specification issues. Overall, the results demonstrate that a more careful and methodical analysis of 




For our formal sensitivity analysis, we take specification 3B from table 3.1 (the model with state-fixed effects) 
as our point of departure. In the first column of table 4.1, we report estimates from a regression which adds a 
general set of time effects to this model. The time effects are jointly significant, and adding these variables leads 




As an additional control for unobserved heterogeneity, the next specification in table 4.1 includes variables for 
state-specific linear trends (i.e., adds interactions of state dummies and linear time-trend variables to the 
existing controls for state- and year-specific effects). These variables account for slowly changing demographic, 
institutional, and preference factors within states, which may be jointly correlated with welfare generosity and 
its other observed determinants. Like the time effects, the state-specific trend variables are jointly significant, 
and, once again, their inclusion has modest effects on the estimated price and income results.  
 
The third regression in table 4.1 adopts the parameterization of the previous model but uses two-stage least 
squares and exclusion restrictions on the sex ratio, female unemployment rate, and state financing share to 
account for the possible endogeneity of price. The sex ratio and unemployment rate are included to proxy 
women's marriage and work opportunities, respectively, and are assumed to affect voters' behavior only 
indirectly through their effects on recipiency. Similarly, the financing share is assumed to have no independent 
effect on benefits other than an indirect effect through the price variable. (We subsequently test this 
assumption.) First-stage results for the price regression (shown in appendix A) indicate that the sex ratio and 
financing share are solid individual predictors, while female unemployment is weaker; the three variables are 
also jointly significant. The second-stage results reveal that--conditional on the inclusion of the state, time, and 
state/trend effects--instrumenting price has little effect on the coefficient estimates. Thus, the null hypothesis 
that price is exogenous cannot be rejected, and Model 4B emerges as our preferred specification.  
 
 
The sensitivity analyses for the inclusion of the time effects and state/trend variables and the endogeneity of 
price are repeated using the three other measures of welfare generosity. As in the previous analyses, the 
specification tests indicate that the time effects and state/trend variables should be included in the model and 
that the price variable can be treated as being exogenous. Results for specifications corresponding to Model 4B 
but using the other dependent variables are presented in the last three columns of table 4.1. The models all 
indicate that income has a small positive effect on welfare benefits and price has a negligible effect.  
 
Table 5 lists estimates and test results from two-stage least squares (2SLS), maximum-benefit models that 
incorporate alternative exclusion restrictions to identify the effect of price. We use the results from these 
regressions to examine whether  
 
(i) our price and income estimates are sensitive to alternative identification restrictions,  
(ii) the restrictions in Model 4C from the previous table or additional restrictions similar to those used in 
previous studies lead to overidentification, and  
(iii) our conclusions regarding the exogeneity of price are sensitive to alternative identification conditions.  
 
The first row in table 5 displays the price and income estimates and exogeneity test results from Model 4C as 
well as test results for whether the exclusion restrictions on either the financing share or the sex ratio and female 
unemployment rate lead to overidentification. Neither of these latter tests rejects the identifying assumptions of 
Model 4C.(n15) The second and third rows in table 5 display results from specifications that drop the financing 
share (Model 5A) and sex ratio and female unemployment rate (Model 5B) as identifying variables. A 
comparison of the results across rows reveals that including the financing share as an instrument reduces the 
price and income coefficient estimates and greatly reduces the associated standard errors.(n16)  
 
The fourth row reports results from a 2SLS regression that adds retail income to the set of identifying variables 
from specification 4C. Along with female unemployment, retail income captures alternative economic 
opportunities among low-skill women who are potential AFDC recipients; Shroder (1995) included a similar 
low-skill wage variable in his set of instruments. Adding retail income as an instrument does not substantially 
alter the price and income coefficient estimates, their standard errors, or the exogeneity test results. It does, 
however, lead to overidentification.(n17)  
 
In the fifth row, a variable for the average benefits in all other states is added to the other identifying variables 
from model 4C. The benefit level in other states was used by Gramlich (1982) as a measure of the incentives for 
welfare-induced migration across states. Adding this variable leads to slightly higher estimates of the price and 
income effects and a rejection of the exogeneity assumption for price, albeit based on a small and incorrectly 
signed coefficient. Like the addition of the retail income variable, it also leads to overidentification. Model 5E 
in the sixth row uses benefit levels and other characteristics of contiguous neighboring states as instruments; 
these variables are similar to the measures that Shroder (1995) employed to describe the migration incentives 
for low-income families. The use of these measures also leads to overidentification but no substantive changes 
in the estimates from Model 4C.  
 
 
Taken together, the results from table 5 indicate that the estimates and tests from Model 4C are based on an 
appropriate set of instruments and exclusion restrictions. Issues of overidentification notwithstanding, the 
results also indicate that our earlier substantive findings of modest positive income effects and weak price 
effects are not particularly sensitive to the choice of instruments.  
 
In table 6, we list results from maximum benefit regressions that are specified like Model 4B but estimated over 
the entire time period 1970 to 1992 and over the pre-OBRA subperiod 1970-1981.(n18) We also present results 
for tests of stability for individual coefficients between the pre- and post-OBRA periods. Estimates of the price 
effects from regressions run using the pre-OBRA data are very similar to those based on the later data. 
However, estimates of the income effects from the earlier period are much weaker than estimates from the later 
period. The income coefficients are also weaker than the majority of studies that examined pre-OBRA data; our 
use of state-fixed effects accounts for this difference. Coefficients for several of the demographic control 
variables as well as the joint set of state-specific effects and state/trend interactions also change significantly 
across time. Not surprisingly, a general test for structural shift strongly rejects the null hypothesis of coefficient 
stability. Thus, estimates based on the pre-OBRA data do not provide reliable predictions of behavior after 
1981. In appendix B, we report results from additional sensitivity tests that show that our general findings and 
structural shift results are robust to the selection of other cut-off dates within two years on either side of the 




It is possible that the relatively small estimates for price and income in the preceding models result from 
measurement error bias that has been exacerbated by our use of fixed-effect controls. Measurement error could 
arise from our use of lagged rather than contemporaneous measures of the independent variables; 
contemporaneous measures might better reflect voters' expectations of the conditions under which their welfare 
decisions would be implemented. Measurement error might also occur if there are nonnegligible transactions 
costs associated with adjusting benefits such that voters respond only to permanent changes in the economic 
variables. To address these concerns, we reestimated Model 4B using contemporaneous measures of the 
independent variables and measures averaged over the previous three years. Results for these specifications 
appear in table 7.  
 
When contemporaneous measures are used, the estimated income effect remains significantly positive but 
becomes weaker. The estimated price effect is also significantly positive, though small. The results may reflect 
increased endogeneity bias from the recipiency component of the contemporaneous price variable. In the 
regressions based on three years of lagged data, the estimated income and price effects become more strongly 
positive and negative, respectively, than the corresponding estimates from Model 4B. Both coefficients are also 
significantly different than zero. The results suggest that voters are more sensitive to permanent changes in the 
economic variables than to transitory changes, and we subsequently refer to these as our "high-end" price and 
income effect estimates.  
 
As a final sensitivity check, we used a Box-Cox regression to examine the functional specification of Model 4B. 
In particular, we estimated a specification of the form  
 
 
where j indexes states, t indexes years, Xjt denotes the sociopolitical controls and fixed effects from Model 4B, 
Epsilonjt is the error term, the [3s are the usual regression coefficients, and Gamma is the Box-Cox coefficient. 
For brevity, detailed results are not reported. The estimated Gamma parameter from the regression was 0.485 
and significantly different from both zero and one. Likelihood ratio tests also rejected both the double-log and 
linear models. Nevertheless, the estimated elasticities for price and income (0.013 and 0.441, respectively) were 
not very different from the estimates from Model 4B. To the extent that the square-root and log functions share 
the same general shape and produce similar substantive results, we feel that the double-log specification 




V. Predictions of the Effects of Block Grants on Benefits  
We use the price and income elasticity estimates from Model 4B and the second specification in table 7 to 
examine the effects of the switch from matching to block grant subsidies in the new TANF program. The 
coefficients from Model 4B provide "low-end" point estimates of the price and income elasticities of -0.02 and 
0.35, respectively, while the coefficients from the second model give us "high-end" point estimates of -0.08 and 
0.51, respectively. To consider the full range of possible effects, we also consider estimates from the lower and 
upper boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals around these estimates. Thus, for price, we examine effects of 
a block grant assuming no price response up to a maximum elasticity of -0.14. For income, the corresponding 
range of elasticity estimates extends from 0.11 to 0.82.  
 
In 1996, the average state received a subsidy of just over 60%. The average effective price increase from an 
immediate switch to block grants assuming no behavioral response on the part of recipients would be 165%. 
Using the point estimates described above, this implies benefit changes of either -3% or -14%, and, with the 
coefficient at the lower boundary of the confidence interval, the average decrease would be at most 22%.(n20) 
These figures are smaller than the effects predicted by Chernick (1996), whose computations adopted the larger 
price sensitivity estimates of previous studies.  
 
To get a better feel for the possible range of effects, we can also consider the changes in particular states. For 
instance, in high-income states like California, Illinois, and New York with 1996 FMAP subsidies of 50%, the 
unadjusted price increase would be 100%, and the decrease in benefits would be at most 14%. For poorer states, 
the effective price increase will be much higher. For instance, in Mississippi, the 1996 FMAP subsidy was just 
over 78%. Block granting implies an effective price increase of 356% and a decrease in benefits of up to 
48%.(n21)  
 
As discussed earlier, the enacted reforms orders will have other effects on the AFDC program besides changing 
the funding mechanism. Several provisions (such as the new time limits for continuing and lifetime receipt of 
benefits, increased work requirements for recipients, and the recent executive order setting school attendance 
requirements for teenage recipients) will either reduce program participation directly or reduce the incentives 
for participation. These reductions will, in turn, lower the effective price of redistribution, mitigating some of 
the increase from the block grant provisions. Thus, the actual decrease in benefits may well be smaller than the 
figures projected above.  
 
The presence of these provisions and the new flexibility that will be granted to states in running their welfare 
programs remind us that there are additional issues of structural shift that the present analysis does not address. 
Also, while prices similar to those that will prevail under the block grant formula appear in the historical record 
for the AFDC program, the projected price increases are nevertheless very large by recent standards (i.e., well 
off the support of the 1982-1992 data).(n22) Accordingly, our predictions should be interpreted with a fair 
degree of caution.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
This article examines differences in states' AFDC generosity using 1969-1992 data. Applying the statistical 
methods used in previous welfare expenditure analyses to a consistent set of data, the study reproduces the 
range of income and price results from that literature. The article carefully reexamines the specification 
assumptions used in these analyses, particularly the assumptions regarding omitted variables and price 
endogeneity. It finds that state- and year-specific fixed-effect and state-specific linear-trend controls are 
appropriate additions to the regression models and that, once these controls are included, the price variable can 
be treated as being exogenous. In other specification tests, the study examines issues involving instrument 
selection, variable measurement, structural shift, and functional form. It finds that the estimated effects of price 
and income on benefits are sensitive to many of these issues.  
 
As a result of this extensive testing procedure, the study is able to reduce the range of acceptable price and 
income estimates to a relatively narrow band. Combining confidence bounds from various estimates, we place 
the range of price elasticities between -0.14 and 0.02. For income, the overlapping confidence bounds are wider, 
with the estimated elasticity ranging from 0.11 to 0.82. These consensus price and income results are at the low 
end of those reported in the literature and indicate that welfare generosity is much less sensitive to economic 
changes than many analysts had previously supposed.  
 
To illustrate the substantive importance of our findings, we examine the implications they have for the change 
in the federal AFDC funding from matching subsidies to block grants that is occurring under the new reform 
legislation. While the effective price increases generated as a direct result of block granting will be enormous, 
ranging from 100% in high-income states to 356% in the poorest state, the very small price estimates imply that 
benefit reductions in most states will be relatively modest. Because the legislation entails other changes that will 
almost surely reduce recipiency and thus partially mitigate the increase states face in their costs of 
redistribution, the actual decreases to individuals remaining on AFDC are likely to be even smaller still.  
Differences between our results and other studies' findings have other important implications for policy. For 
example, estimates from most previous studies indicated that, with or without federal encouragement, benefit 
growth would essentially keep pace with states' income growth. However, our findings of more modest income 
effects suggest that benefit growth will fall behind income growth. Coupling these results with the likely effects 
of block granting, the prospects for benefit growth in the near term appear dim.  
 
Our investigation also points to several avenues for future research. One crucial area that we have not examined 
here is an underlying structural explanation for the various fixed-effects controls. We presume that these 
controls capture heterogeneity in voter attitudes and preferences, characteristics of the needy, and institutions 
across states and time; however, explicit tests of these conjectures are beyond the scope of the present study. 
Clearly, it is important to examine not only whether fixed effects belong in these models but why they belong 
there. Another issue that is not taken up here but explored in another of our studies (Moffitt et al., 1998) is 
whether the median-voter framework provides an adequate description of state welfare expenditure behavior or 
whether alternative models might offer better structural explanations. While our other work indicates that a 
more precise implementation of the median-voter approach is consistent with the results presented here, we 
have not developed similarly precise empirical representations of the alternative approaches. The explanatory 
power of the a theoretical fixed-effects controls in our regressions cautions us that we have left quite a bit of 
room for alternative structural models. Finally, the TANF program and its accompanying legislation create new 
research opportunities. The switch to block grant funding, lifetime restrictions on eligibility, and changes in 
other programs such as Food Stamps, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, child support enforcement, and 
other social service programs all represent large exogenous shocks from the perspective of the states. As data 
become available, these changes can be used by researchers to reexamine the effects that prices and other 
program features have on benefits.  
 
Notes 
 (n1) Maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirements set a floor on benefit levels as a condition of receiving the 
block grant. Chernick (1996) provides a detailed analysis of incentive effects of various block grant schemes, 
incorporating both MOE requirements and program-interaction effects.  
(n2) Some authors motivate their analyses using alternative models of political competition. (See, e.g., Plotnick, 
1986; Baumgardner, 1993.) However, with the exception of Baumgardner's study, estimating equations in these 
studies are indistinguishable from specifications in which political variables reflect preferences of the median 
voter. We adopt the median-voter framework mainly to introduce notation and generate rough hypotheses.  
(n3) The utility function reflects interdependent preferences (Hochman & Rodgers, 1969; Becket, 1974).  
(n4) Table 1 is not an exhaustive list of AFDC expenditure models. Several economic models are not easily 
comparable to those in table 1, either because they do not model price as depending on recipiency (e.g., Husted, 
1989; Smith, 1991), define recipiency differently (e.g., Baumgardner, 1993), or focus on total welfare 
expenditures (Craig, 1994; Craig & Inman, 1986). In addition, there is a related political science literature (e.g., 
Peterson & Rom, 1990; Tweedie, 1991) that implicitly specifies dynamic models of AFDC benefits.  
(n5) While fixed-effects techniques are useful in addressing omittedvariables bias, they do not identify which 
specific unobserved factors influence welfare generosity. Preference heterogeneity appears to be a reasonable 
candidate. Attitudes and values have occupied a central position in attempts to understand the public's 
dissatisfaction with welfare (e.g., Ellwood, 1988; Cook & Barrett, 1992). However, of the studies in table 1, 
only Moffitt et al. (1998), Plotnick and Winters (1985), and Ribar and Wilhelm (1996) emphasized the 
modeling of redistributional preferences.  
(n6) In 1969, 36 states were on the old AFDC formula with the remainder on the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage (FMAP) schedule. By 1976, the number on the AFDC schedule had been reduced to ten and by 
1982 had fallen to two. After 1982, all states were on the FMAP schedule. Most studies using the early data 
selected the si for states on the old formula, while some (Gramlich and Gramlich-Laren) dropped states still on 
the old formula. Moffitt (1984) modeled the simultaneous choice and found weaker price effects.  
(n7) For instance, the formula under the FMAP schedule is (1- si) = Max [Min [.50, .45 x (yily)2], .17] where y 
represents national per capita income. Under the old AFDC schedule, the matching rate was 5/6 up to benefits 
of $18 per recipient per month, the state's "federal percentage" for benefits between $18 and $32, and zero for 
benefits exceeding $32. The federal percentage was also a function of per capita income.  
(n8) There is actually also a structural source of endogeneity in the Food Stamp Program where individuals' 
benefits are reduced by thirty percent of their AFDC awards.  
(n9) See Peterson and Rom (1990) and Corbett (1991).  
(n10) Consider the identification questions present in the fixed effects analyses by Gramlich (1982) and 
Gramlich and Laren (1984) which use mean welfare benefits in all other states as measures of an. Once controls 
for a general time series are introduced, the residual variation in ai and an must be perfectly negatively 
correlated.  
(n11) For a more detailed examination of these issues, the reader is referred to the working paper version of this 
study (Ribar & Wilhelm, 1994).  
(n12) Twelve-month averages for monthly recipiency are unavailable for the early years of our sample and 
would have been prohibitively expensive to compute. Two-month averages should reduce problems of 
seasonality or excessive variability that might be associated with figures from a single month. For years in 
which comparisons can be made, there is little difference in results based on two- and twelve-month averages.  
(n13) In a separate analysis (Moffitt et al., 1998), we determined that estimates of the benefit demand function 
were not particularly sensitive to the use of median versus average income.  
(n14) Other analysts (e.g., Moffitt, 1987, 1990) have discussed the role played by structural shifts in public 
assistance policies in explaining the time-series variation in benefits and recipiency. Among these shifts were a 
number of changes in the AFDC program itself: a decrease in the benefit reduction rate (the rate at which 
outside income reduces program benefits) from 100% to 67% in 1967, a series of court decisions that expanded 
eligibility in the early 1970s, the 1981 OBRA changes, and reforms from the Family Support Act of 1988. 
Other sources of structural variation were the creation of additional public assistance programs, most notably 
Food Stamps in 1961 and Medicaid in 1965, and changes in these programs such as the effective taxation of 
AFD2 benefits and elimination of the purchase requirement in the Food Stamp program in 1977 and the 
expansion of Medicaid coverage for non-AFDC families in the mid-1980s. Finally, stigma associated with 
welfare participation may have diminished over time.  
(n15) Because the coefficient on the log of the financing share in the first-stage price regression differs slightly 
from one (see appendix A), the test for overidentification from the financing share is not exactly equivalent to a 
test of the functional restrictions from equation (1). Exact tests (not shown) fail to reject the restriction that the 
coefficients on the log financing share and recipiency variables in the benefits model are equal. Note that all of 
our tests for overidentification are conditioned on the remaining exclusion restrictions.  
(n16) We estimated a regression along the lines of Model 4B using the financing share in place of the price 
variable (i.e., the reduced form for Model 5B) and obtained results that were nearly identical to those reported 
for Model 5B. See Gramlich (1982) and Gramlich and Laren (1984) for other reduced-form results in the 
literature. Craig and Inman (1986) also estimated models using the financing share alone as the price; however, 
their analysis focused on welfare expenditures rather than maximum benefits per family.  
(n17) Moffitt et al. (1998) discuss and report evidence of independent effects of low-skill wages on benefit 
determination.  
(n18) Although the analysis data extend back to 1969, the use of lagged data for the independent variables 
prevents us from examining the determinants of benefits in that initial year.  
(n19) Box-Cox regressions for the model with independent variables averaged over the previous three years 
produced similar results (specifically, rejection of both the linear and double-log models with an estimated 
Gamma of .475, estimated price elasticity of -0.015, and estimated income elasticity of 0.329).  
(n20) The estimated effects incorporate both price and income effects. The income effects model the block 
grant subsidies; however, because the total amount of the subsidies are small relative to total income within 
each state, the income effects are negligible.  
(n21) MOE provisions of the TANF program, which do not allow states to drop welfare expenditures by more 
than 20% to 25%, would seem to rule out such a large reduction in benefits by Mississippi. To reduce benefits 
by 48%, the state would have to increase its expenditures in other areas such as child care, work training, or 
administration.  
(n22) Recall that under the old federal percentage formula, states were not subsidized for the portion of monthly 
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